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Evidence from 145 NGAAP Restatements 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Firms listed on stock exchanges within the European Economic Area 
are required to report consolidated financial statements according to 
IFRS from 2005. The firms that adopted IFRS in 2005 were also re-
quired to restate their 2004 financial statements from national GAAP 
to provide comparable accounting figures. These two sets of financial 
statements for 2004 are thus based on identical underlying economic 
activities and are fully specified according to two different reporting 
regimes. Our sample consists of 145 restatements from NGAAP to 
IFRS for firms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange in Norway. We test 
whether the IFRS accounting figures correlate more strongly with 
stock market values than the corresponding NGAAP figures. We find 
little evidence of increased value-relevance after adopting IFRS when 
comparing and evaluating the two regimes unconditionally. On the 
other hand, when evaluating the change in the accounting figures 
from NGAAP to IFRS, we find evidence that the reconcilement ad-
justments to IFRS are marginally value-relevant due to increased re-
levance of the balance sheet and the normalized net operating income. 
By weighting our sample by firm size, intangible asset intensity and 
profitability, we learn that the increased value-relevance of the net 
operating income stems from different reporting of intangible assets. 
Since more intangible assets are capitalized according to IFRS than 
NGAAP, our finding is consistent with the view that capitalizing in-
tangible assets is more value-relevant than expensing them as in-
curred or through goodwill amortization. 
 
Keywords: Value-relevance of reporting standards, IFRS versus NGAAP, account-
ing harmonization, balance sheet-oriented conceptual frameworks versus earnings-
oriented conceptual frameworks. 
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1. Introduction 
In 2002, the European Union decided that firms listed on stock exchanges within the Euro-
pean Economic Area have to report consolidated financial statements according to Interna-
tional Financial Reporting Standards, IFRS. This new reporting regime started in 2005. It is 
important for accounting producers, regulators, standard-setters and users to gain insight 
about how the largest accounting reform within the EU/EEA may improve the usefulness of 
accounting information from an investor perspective.1 When estimating the value-relevance of 
adopting IFRS, proper benchmarks are required. These benchmarks should be constructed so 
that only financial reporting effects are captured. As part of the IFRS adoption, financial 
statements prepared according to local or national accounting standards for 2004 had to be 
restated to IFRS in the 2005 accounts (IFRS 1, paragraph 36). Thus there exist two compara-
ble sets of financial statements, representing the same underlying economic activities, which 
enable us to evaluate IFRS relative to national standards and to capture only financial report-
ing effects. 
From a policy perspective, IFRS should be compared with feasible alternatives. IFRS 
are clearly more value-relevant than national standards for countries with a weak tradition of 
disclosing information useful for investors, see Ball (2006) and Daske, Hail, Leuz and Verdi 
(2007). Conservatism in terms of biased accounting estimates typically found in these coun-
tries should thus not be included in any policy benchmark used to evaluate the value-
relevance of IFRS. One relevant alternative is an advanced national accounting standard based 
on an earnings-oriented conceptual framework with focus on non-biased matching of costs 
with earned revenues. This would contrast the balance sheet-oriented conceptual framework 
of IFRS with focus on non-biased fair value accounting and no emphasis on the matching 
principle. Our choice of benchmark, Norwegian Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, 
                                                 
1 The control or stewardship perspective is not evaluated in this paper. This, of course, does not mean that con-
trol relevance is less important when evaluating the relevance of IFRS. 
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satisfies this requirement. NGAAP are principle-based, earnings-oriented and require the use 
of unbiased accounting estimates. We believe that NGAAP are an interesting, and challeng-
ing, benchmark for IFRS and employ two-sided tests for overall value-relevance differences. 
A failure to reject the null hypothesis of equal value-relevance will contribute not only to 
question the superiority of a balance-oriented conceptual framework in general, cf. Dichev 
(2007), but also IFRS in particular, as the most relevant reporting regime for investors, cf. 
Ball (2006). 
In addition, we believe it is valuable in itself to obtain knowledge about the conse-
quences of implementing IFRS in a given country and compare results across nations. Two 
examples are Callao, Jarne and Lainez (2007) and Horton and Serafeim (2007), where na-
tional benchmarks are the Spanish GAAP and the UKGAAP, respectively. This type of stud-
ies may provide more in depth analyses of the accounting sources of value-relevance differ-
ences than studies involving a large sample of countries like Daske, Hail, Leuz and Verdi 
(2007) and Jermakowicz and Gornik-Tomaszewski (2006). The focus of the former lies 
mainly on the economic consequences of mandatory IFRS reporting, while the latter is con-
cerned with the IFRS adoption process. 
We have collected market and accounting data for all firms listed on the Oslo Stock Ex-
change, OSE, in 2004 and 2005. 145 of these firms reported financial statements in 2004 ac-
cording to NGAAP, and restated them when adopting IFRS in 2005. The objective is to iden-
tify value-relevance differences between the 2004 IFRS and NGAAP financial statements and 
to extract important policy implications from our findings. We perform two types of tests to 
determine value-relevance differences and their significance between IFRS and the chosen 
benchmark NGAAP; two-sample unconditional comparison tests and marginal dependency 
tests, utilizing value-relevance measures derived from price, return and abnormal return re-
gressions. 
- 3 - 
Our unconditional comparison tests reveal that NGAAP get a high score on the value-
relevance measure, as compared to IFRS. In fact, when evaluated by price regressions, in 
which book value of equity and various decompositions of earnings per share are explanatory 
variables, the value-relevance of the NGAAP figures is significantly higher than that of the 
corresponding IFRS figures. Improved value-relevance of the balance sheet (equity) turns out 
to be offset by reduced value-relevance of the income statement (earnings). When evaluated 
by return or abnormal return regressions, using price-deflated earnings and/or change in earn-
ings as explanatory variables, the scores on the value-relevance measures are also typically in 
favor of NGAAP earnings. These results are also valid when the sample is weighted accord-
ing to firm size, intangible asset intensity and profitability. No improvement in value-
relevance seriously challenges the benefits of adopting IFRS for countries such as Norway 
with an advanced accounting regulation prior to IFRS adoption. This result is consistent with 
the finding of Daske, Hail, Leuz and Verdi (2007) that the capital-market benefits of adopting 
IFRS are weaker when national GAAP are closer to IFRS, see also Callao, Jarne and Lainez 
(2007), Horton and Serafeim (2007) and Van der Meulen, Gaeremynck and Willekens 
(2007ab). Although NGAAP are based on an earnings-oriented conceptual framework with 
emphasize on matching cost with earned revenue, it turns out to be of minor importance when 
it comes to unconditional value-relevance differences in comparison with a balance sheet-
oriented alternative.  
The main result of our marginal dependency tests is that IFRS contain additional value-
relevant information as compared to NGAAP: 2 Using price regressions, the adjustment of the 
book value of equity from NGAAP to IFRS is significant; suggesting that increased meas-
urement at fair value improves value-relevance of the balance sheet (but not earnings). Using 
return and abnormal return regressions, the adjustment of the normalized net operating in-
                                                 
2 Marginal tests were introduced by Amir, Harris and Venuti (1993) in order to evaluate the value-relevance of 
reconciliation adjustment between USGAAP and non-USGAAP, see also Pope and Rees (1992), Barth and 
Clinch (1996) and Harris and Muller (1999). 
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come from NGAAP to IFRS is significant – although this is not true for overall earnings. 
Thus, information about net operating assets, revenue recognition and cost determination ac-
cording to IFRS is on the margin valuable to investors. Transitory components in earnings due 
for example to revaluations, seem to harm the overall value relevance of earnings (but not of 
the balance sheet) and prove the necessity of reporting these items separately so that earnings 
may be normalized, see Bradshaw and Sloan (2002). This suggests that the adoption of IFRS 
in countries already having an advanced accounting regulation may still be important from a 
value-relevance perspective. To get further insight into what areas of reporting that drive this 
result, we control for potential extreme observations and industry effects as well as weight our 
sample according to known value-relevance drivers such as firm size, intangible asset inten-
sity and profitability. 
We find that intangible-intensive firms report a net operational income that on the mar-
gin is more value-relevant according to IFRS than NGAAP. Since more intangible assets are 
capitalized according to IFRS, our finding is consistent with the view that the capitalization of 
intangible expenditures as assets in the balance sheet is more value-relevant than expensing 
them as incurred, see Lev and Zarowin (1999), Aboody and Lev (1998) and Lev and Sou-
giannis (1996). For example, development expenditures are required to be capitalized accord-
ing to IFRS if they are assets, while they more often are expensed as incurred according to 
NGAAP – although an option to capitalize is available. Internally generated goodwill is indi-
rectly capitalized according to IFRS due to the non-amortization of purchased goodwill and 
other intangible assets with indefinite economic lives, while these assets are systematically 
amortized according to NGAAP. IFRS require intangible assets with indefinite lives to be 
tested annually for impairment. 
In Norway and other countries with a developed accounting regulation prior to the 
adoption of IFRS, the advantage of implementing this reform has been questioned. Our em-
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pirical findings support this view in the sense that the unconditional value-relevance of IFRS 
is not larger than that of NGAAP. On the other hand, our marginal dependency findings show 
that IFRS have marginal value-relevance relative to NGAAP. These benefits may outbalance 
implementation costs, especially when taking into account the positive effects of a harmoniza-
tion leading to increased value-relevance in countries with a less developed accounting sys-
tem, see Daske, Hail, Leuz, and Verdi (2007). This is an advantage for all investors investing 
in the international capital market. 
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give a short overview of the differ-
ences between IFRS and NGAAP, concentrating on the main differences rather than technical 
details. These differences are the basis for formulating our test hypotheses and for developing 
an appropriate test methodology in Section 3. In Section 4, we present the data and give some 
descriptive statistics. The test results and discussion of their implications are found in Section 
5, while Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Differences between IFRS and NGAAP 
International Financial Reporting Standards, IFRS, are issued by the International Accounting 
Standards Board, IASB, in London. IASB aims at developing international accounting stan-
dards of high quality for the benefit of accounting harmonization worldwide. In 2002, the 
European Union decided that all firms listed on stock exchanges within the European Eco-
nomic Area, EEA, i.e. the European Union and some smaller countries outside the EU, should 
report consolidated financial statements according to IFRS, beginning in 2005 (EU Regula-
tion 1606/2002). These firms are now the main users of IFRS, along with firms from many 
countries allowing or requiring IFRS. Norwegian Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, 
NGAAP, are the national accounting regulation in Norway, a member of the EEA. The most 
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important regulations are the Accounting Act of 1998 and the national accounting standards, 
issued by the Norwegian Accounting Standards Board, NASB. 
IFRS are based on a balance sheet-oriented conceptual framework, i.e. the approach 
starts with defining assets, debt and thereby equity as the residual. Comprehensive income in 
terms of reported earnings and 'dirty surplus' constitutes the change in equity not related to 
capital expansion or withdrawal, for example paid dividends. When the balance sheet is the 
starting point, as is the case in classical valuation theory, it comes natural to measure the bal-
ance sheet at fair values and to make the net income equal to the net change in fair values, at 
least when these values can be measured reliably. Cost accounting is accepted when there is 
no reliable alternative. Over time, IFRS have increasingly pointed at fair value as the principle 
of measurement. 
NGAAP are based on an earnings-oriented conceptual framework in which the calcula-
tion of annual performance is the starting point for developing relevant accounting. A project, 
or a firm, creates values if its internal rate of equity return is greater than the cost of equity. 
This suggests that the aim of accounting should be to report an income and a book value of 
equity such that the return on equity becomes a reliable measure of the internal rate of equity 
return, see Hendriksen and van Breda (1992, pp. 315-317 and pp. 541-546). This return is 
calculated on the basis of transactional investment costs being matched with future economic 
benefits generated by those costs. Net income should therefore be the costs matched with 
earned revenues – and the balance sheet is in principle the transactional cost value. Neverthe-
less, when cost is lower than fair value, it is written down, suggesting a partial adjustment to 
fair value (conservatism). Impairment losses add noise to the calculation of the internal rate of 
equity return. 
The major difference between IFRS and NGAAP, as these accounting regimes have de-
veloped over time, is that the preferred principle of measurement in reality has become fair 
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value according to IFRS and cost according to NGAAP. However, none of these reporting 
regimes are completely faithful to their ideal measurement principle. IFRS have the cost mod-
el as an alternative or a requirement when fair value is not easily and reliably measurable, 
while NGAAP have the fair value model as a requirement when market value is lower than 
cost and when fair value of financial instruments is reliably measurable in liquid markets. All 
in all, the discrepancy between IFRS and NGAAP is not large in practice – and could be 
summarized by IFRS allowing for more reporting at fair value. 
To illustrate, we focus on the measurement of intangible and fixed assets. IFRS and 
NGAAP agree that initial recognition should be at cost, which usually equals fair value at the 
time of acquisition. Thereafter, the two reporting regimes may disagree on measurement. 
IFRS permit either the cost model or the revaluation model; although the latter is accepted 
only if fair values may be measured reliably. NGAAP, on the other hand, require the cost 
model. According to prudent historical cost, the carrying amount of an intangible or fixed 
asset is the cost less accumulated depreciation less accumulated impairment losses. The re-
valuation model implies that the carrying amount is fair value when a revaluation takes place. 
Between revaluations, the amount is reduced by depreciation and possible impairment. The 
times of revaluations should be so regular that the carrying amount does not differ materially 
from its fair value. Since most firms using IFRS will choose the cost model, due to difficulties 
of measuring fair value reliably, the carrying amount of fixed and intangible assets according 
to IFRS and NGAAP will be very close.3 
Some of the most important differences between IFRS and NGAAP are: 1) NGAAP re-
quire goodwill to be amortized over the best estimate of the useful life and tested for impair-
ment losses. IFRS require only that it, along with other intangible assets of indefinite lives, is 
                                                 
3 Even when the revaluation model is chosen according to IFRS and the cost model according to NGAAP, the 
reported income may not differ much. The reason is that fair value write-downs are included in the cost model 
through prudence and that fair value write-ups are excluded from reported income in the revaluation model. 
Instead, they are reported directly as an adjustment to equity, i.e. as 'dirty surplus'. In this way, write-ups are 
included only in comprehensive income. 
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tested annually for impairment. 2) According to IFRS, research expenditures should be ex-
pensed when incurred, while NGAAP render the option of recognizing research expenditures 
as an intangible asset – an option seldom used by stock exchange listed firms. Development 
expenditures leading to future economic benefits should be recognized as an intangible asset 
according to IFRS, while NGAAP have the option to expense immediately – an option often 
used. 3) Periodic maintenance of an asset is accounted for as an investment according to 
IFRS, which is depreciated over time until the next periodic maintenance. NGAAP also allow 
it to be reported as a future obligation (provision). An annual maintenance provision is taken 
over the period until the next periodic maintenance expenditure. Generally, provisions are 
more rarely recognized as debt according to IFRS than NGAAP, since it could be questioned 
whether future expenditures, such as maintenance and some types of restructuring, really are 
present obligations according to the definition of debt. 4) According to IFRS, inventories be-
ing biological assets, like farmed fish, should be measured according to fair values when such 
values may be measured reliably. Other inventories should be measured at the lower of cost 
and market. The latter principle is the only alternative for inventories according to NGAAP. 
5) Most financial instruments are measured at fair value and amortized cost according to 
IFRS. In accordance with NGAAP, financial assets and debt are measured at cost, unless they 
are short-term financial instruments traded in a liquid market. In that case, they are measured 
at fair value. 6) Investment properties are measured at fair value according to IFRS and cost 
according to NGAAP. In addition to these six areas, differences between IFRS and NGAAP 
typically appear in relation to pensions, deferred taxes and to some extent share-based pay-
ments. 
The auditing firm Ernst & Young has registered descriptive data about the IFRS imple-
mentation of 110 companies listed on the OSE in 2005. 28% of the firms reported a reduction 
in the 2004 net income, while 72% reported an increase. On average, the increase in net in-
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come was 17%. The largest effects on reported net income are caused by non-amortization of 
goodwill (40%) and capitalization of development expenditures (28%), suggesting that ac-
counting for intangible assets causes the largest differences in reported income between IFRS 
and NGAAP.4 
 
3. Hypotheses and Test Methodology 
Our two test hypotheses, specified as alternatives to their nulls, follow from the review of 
IFRS and NGAAP in Section 2: 
1) The value-relevance of IFRS financial statements is significantly different from that of 
NGAAP statements, as evaluated by the adjusted R2 in market value regressions with 
appropriate accounting variables as explanatory variables. 
2) The value-relevance of particular accounting items like book value and earnings are 
significantly different in IFRS financial statements relative to NGAAP statements, as 
evaluated by these items' associated regression coefficients and their marginal contribu-
tion to the adjusted R2, and weighted by potential value-relevance drivers such as intan-
gible asset intensity and profitability. 
We are open for the finding that NGAAP might be more value-relevant than IFRS, al-
though most observers would expect the introduction of IFRS to be an improvement. Thus, 
two-sided tests are employed. 
The value-relevance of accounting information in general, and reporting standards like 
NGAAP and IFRS in particular, may be evaluated by employing price, return and abnormal 
return regressions, see Barth, Beaver and Landsman (2001) and Holthausen and Watts (2001) 
regarding the appropriateness of value-relevance regressions for standard-setting and hence 
evaluation of reporting regimes. Two types of tests are employed, see Biddle, Seow and Sie-
                                                 
4 The largest implementation effect on equity at the beginning of 2004 relative to the equity at the end of 2003 
was caused by asset being revaluated to fair value (26%). The average change in initial equity value was 6%. 
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gel (1995). The first one, a two-sample unconditional comparison test, considers the two re-
porting regimes as independent samples.5 The second one, a marginal dependent comparison 
test, takes one reporting regime as the base and looks at the marginal value-relevance of hav-
ing access to the other, see Amir, Harris and Venuti (1993). In our case, the base is NGAAP 
and the reconciliation goes from NGAAP to IFRS. 
Our price regression model takes the following form: 
 
(1) P't = α0 + α1 · B't-1 + α2 · Et + εt, 
 
 
where P't is the inefficiency-adjusted share price quoted in the stock market at the end of year 
t. B't-1 is the book value per outstanding share at time t-1 plus 'dirty surplus' in year t less net 
dividends per share in year t (i.e. dividends minus net capital expansions), as dividends have 
been paid out at the end of year t and are therefore not included in P't.6 Consequently, B't-1 = 
Bt - Et, where Bt is the reported book value per share at time t and Et is reported earnings per 
share in year t. Et is subtracted from Bt to reduce collinearity and to obtain proper loading of 
Et, cf. Footnote 7. Finally, α0, α1 and α2 are the regression coefficients, while εt is the error 
term. 
Following Aboody, Hughes and Liu (2002), the stock price in Model (1) has been ad-
justed for possible market inefficiency by calculating P't = Pt · (1 + rt+1)/(1 + kt+1), where Pt is 
the observed stock price at the end of year t, rt+1 is the forthcoming stock return in year t+1 
                                                 
5 However, independency assumption could be loosened by employing Hausman’s specification test, testing 
whether there are systematic differences between coefficients when allowing for a more general covariance ma-
trix, see e.g. Green (2008, pp. 208-209) and Thursby (1985). On the other hand, this test could have small sam-
ple problems, preventing the covariance matrix from being positive definite. A small sample could also cause the 
test’s asymptotic assumptions to fail. It could also be question whether one set of coefficient estimates are more 
efficient than the other set, an assumption yielding the special covariance structure implicitly imposed by the 
Hausman test. 
6 If, as is the case according to NGAAP, proposed dividends are reclassified as short-term debt, the dividends 
should be added back to equity from an equity investor perspective. In this way, the equity in annual accounts is 
reduced when dividends are paid out (or at least decided by the general assembly), as is the case according to 
IFRS. By doing so, the difference between NGAAP and IFRS caused by the misclassification of proposed divi-
dends from an investor perspective will not become a disturbing element in our tests. 
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and kt+1 is the required rate of return in year t+1. This required return may be estimated by 
splitting rt+1 into size and book-to-price portfolios for all listed firms in year t+1, such that 
abnormal return, art+1, equals rt+1 less the average stock return in the proper size and book-to-
price portfolio, see Fama and French (1992). On average, the abnormal return for all firms 
will be zero in year t+1. The idea behind using P't in Model (1) is that in a possibly inefficient 
market, in which accounting information is slowly reflected in stock prices, the discounted 
value of the following year's stock price, Pt+1/(1 + kt+1), is more representative for measuring 
value-relevance than this year's stock price, Pt. The length of the delayed response depends on 
the efficiency characteristics of the stock market and may vary from zero to several months, 
and even to several years in extreme cases. 
The value-relevance of book value and earnings per share is measured by the adjusted 
R2 from price regression (1). The difference between NGAAP and IFRS may be analyzed by 
a two-sample unconditional comparison test focusing on differences in adjusted R2 and on 
statistical inference from the standard deviations of adjusted R2 found in Cramer (1987), see 
also Harris, Lang and Möller (1994, Footnote 38). However, since the dependent variable, the 
stock price, is the same irrespective of reporting regime when utilizing a dataset of restated 
financial statements, the difference in adjusted R2 could also be tested as in Lien and Vuong 
(1987) and Vuong (1989), see also Green (2008, pp. 137-142). When appropriate, the Vuong 
test is more powerful than the Cramer test. The small sample properties of especially the 
Cramer test have been questioned, see Hope (2007). The associated response coefficients, α1 
and α2, indicate how book value and earnings influence market value. Furthermore, we may 
estimate the importance of various accounting items by analyzing coefficient changes be-
tween IFRS and NGAAP. Marginal changes in adjusted R2 due to the inclusion of different 
accounting items also shed light on this issue. In a broader sense, the value-relevance of the 
balance sheet versus the income statement may be assessed, especially when substituting par-
- 12 - 
titions of the book value and earnings into Model (1), such as assets and liabilities, revenues 
and costs, or finer partitions of these. 
It is well known that price regressions do not satisfy all OLS-regression assumptions, 
heteroskedasticity and scale effects often have a disturbing impact on results.7 Scale effects 
generally arise from the fact that larger firm have larger market capitalizations, larger book 
values and larger earnings as opposed to smaller firms, see e.g. Barth and Kallapur (1996), 
Brown, Lo and Lys (1999) and Easton and Summers (2003). Therefore, a cross-sectional re-
gression of market capitalization on book value and earnings might not capture more than the 
existing scale variation. The adjusted R2 in a regression with a common scale factor is thus 
overestimated. 
The remedy for reducing scale effects is usually to deflate the market capitalization re-
gression by the number of outstanding shares and thereby obtaining a price regression like 
Model (1). However, this model is also affected by scale problems since firms with a higher 
stock price typically have a higher book value per share and higher earnings per share relative 
to smaller firms. The remaining scale problems may thus be reduced by looking at the return 
regression specified by Model (2) below, which focuses on deflated changes in the market and 
accounting variables of Model (1), employing the previous year's stock price as the preferred 
deflator. Still, the price regression (1) may better capture the value-relevance of the balance 
sheet, as B is an explanatory variable only in Model (1) and not in Model (2) and (3). 
The return regression model takes the following form: 
 
(2) r't = β0 + β1 · et-1 + β2 · Δet + εt, 
                                                 
7 Due to possible heteroskedasticity, the t-values of the regression coefficients should be adjusted employing 
robust standard deviations, see White (1980). Even though accounting variables might be significantly corre-
lated, multicollinearity is usually a minor problem. Notice that Model (1) extracts E from B in order to avoid 
double accounting of E and thereby potentially underestimating the earnings response coefficient. If E is in-
cluded in B as suggested by for example Penman (1998), there will also be built-in multicollinearity in the em-
pirical specification. 
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where the inefficiency-adjusted stock market return r't equals rt ⋅ (1 + rt+1)/(1 + kt+1), in which 
rt is the stock market return in period t. The earnings variable, et-1, is the earnings per share in 
year t-1 deflated by the stock price in year t-1, while the earnings change variable, Δet, is the 
change in earnings per share in year t deflated by the same stock price. Thus, et-1 = Et-1/Pt-1 
and Δet = ΔEt/Pt-1. Model (2) includes one level-variable, et-1, one change-variable, Δet, and no 
built-in multicollinearity. Both variables are related to the income statement and not to the 
level of the balance sheet, suggesting that Model (2) may not be an appropriate way of evalu-
ating the value-relevance of the balance sheet. 
The value-relevance of the price-deflated earnings and the price-deflated change in 
earnings are measured by the adjusted R2 of Model (2). The regression coefficients, β1 and β2, 
indicate the stock market return relevance of the earnings' level at time t-1 and of the change 
in earnings from t-1 to t. Any differences in response coefficients, adjusted R2 and the mar-
ginal contribution to adjusted R2 of various accounting items may be utilized to express the 
value-relevance of reporting standards like IFRS and NGAAP. Generally, the return regres-
sion (2) is considered to be less influenced by scale effect problems than the price regression 
(1). Stock market return possesses a scale dimension as it is determined by the expected or 
required rate of return, E(rt) = kt. This scale may accordingly be reduced by deducting the 
required rate of return from the realized return, i.e., by focusing on abnormal returns, art = rt - 
E(rt). 
The abnormal return regression model takes the following form: 
 
(3) ar't = φ0 + φ1 · Δet + εt, 
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where ar't is the inefficiency-adjusted abnormal stock market return in year t. Since the re-
quired rate of abnormal return is zero, ar't = (1 + art) ⋅ (1 + art+1) - 1 or ar't = art ⋅ (1 + art+1).8 
The abnormal return equals stock return less the expected or required return from the stock 
market, E(rt | βt-1, St-1, Bt-1/Pt-1, ...), which is based on conventional risk factors such as the 
stock's systematic risk (beta) and proxy risk factors such as firm size (e.g. measured by the 
logarithm of stock market equity value) and the firm's book-to-price ratio, see Fama and 
French (1992).9 
The ability of the price-deflated change in earnings to explain abnormal stock market 
return is extracted from the adjusted R2 and the earnings change coefficient φ1 of Model (3). 
Since earnings may be decomposed into various income measures and ultimately into a num-
ber of revenue and cost items, the abnormal return regression may be used to evaluate the 
value-relevance of those items, including differences in reporting regimes like shifting from 
NGAAP to IFRS. Generally, the abnormal return regression (3) is less influenced by scale and 
other empirical problems than does the return regression (2). Although we follow the tradition 
by including results from price and return regressions, our conclusions regarding the value-
relevance of earnings will primarily be based on our findings on abnormal stock market per-
formance. Nevertheless, the price regression (1) is very suitable for assessing the value-
relevance of the balance sheet. 
Following Amir, Harris and Venuti (1993) and Barth and Clinch (1996), the reconcilia-
tion adjustment between two regimes may be evaluated by a marginal dependency test in 
                                                 
8 There are alternative ways of calculating inefficiency-adjusted abnormal returns, e.g. ar't = art · (1 + rt+1)/(1 + 
kt+1) and, if calculated by logarithms, ar't = art + art+1. Notice that there is a potential cost of this adjustment: It 
may add noise. If the added noise becomes significant, leading to a significant decrease in adjusted R2, this cost 
might surpass the benefits of the inefficiency-adjustment. 
9 Abnormal returns may be estimated on a monthly basis using a two-step procedure: First, preliminary abnor-
mal returns are estimated from a time-series 36 months back and collecting normal returns from the market mod-
el. Thus, the abnormal return is adjusted for systematic (beta) risk. Second, these abnormal returns are adjusted 
on the cross-section for all firms in a given year for size and book-price effects, conditioned on the requirement 
that the abnormal return for all listed firms should equal zero for every month over the year. This condition im-
plies that the final abnormal returns also are adjusted for periodic effects like the well-documented January ef-
fect. 
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which the price, return or abnormal return regression given by Model (1), (2) or (3) is ex-
panded by including the change in accounting variables for the two regimes. For instance, the 
expanded abnormal return regression is: 
 
(4) ar't = φ0 + φ1 · Δet + φ2 · ΔΔet + εt, 
 
where Δet = ΔENGAAPt/Pt-1 is the price-deflated earnings change according to the base account-
ing regime NGAAP, while ΔΔet = (ΔEIFRSt - ΔENGAAPt)/Pt-1 is the difference in the earnings 
change between the two reporting regimes, deflated by the price. In this way, the marginal or 
incremental value-relevance of IFRS earnings may be tested from the originally reported 
NGAAP earnings, suggesting that a marginal increase in adjusted R2 by including the IFRS 
earnings' reconciliation in Model (4) would be consistent with the IFRS figures being value-
relevant on the margin. A significant response coefficient, φ2, renders information about 
which accounting item is relevant if earnings are split into its underlying components, for in-
stance net operating income, net financial cost and net non-recurring items. The marginal test 
is, however, less powerful than the two-sample unconditional comparison test for the value-
relevance of altering an accounting regime. An advantage of using (4) is that the marginal 
increase in adjusted R2 could be tested by a standard F-test as the NGAAP - regression is 
nested within the regression with reconcilement adjustments to IFRS, see e.g. Green (2008, 
pp. 89-90). 
 
4. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
In order to test the hypotheses specified in Section 3 regarding value-relevance differences 
between IFRS and NGAAP, we have utilized a sample in which the underlying economic 
events are identical. 
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- INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE – 
 
According to Panel A of Table 1, 145 of the 219 firms listed on the Oslo Stock Ex-
change by the end of 2005 restated their NGAAP financial statements for 2004 to IFRS, a 
process governed by IFRS 1 First Time Adoption of International Financial Reporting Stan-
dards. In 2005, 14% of the firms listed on the OSE did not report according to IFRS since 
they do not disclose consolidated financial statements, have their primary listing on a non-
European exchange or have temporary delayed the implementation of IFRS. Although our 
sample of financial statements according to both NGAAP and IFRS gives a unique opportu-
nity to test the effects of switching to a different reporting regime, as we do not have to con-
trol for differences in the underlying economic activities, a few remaining considerations have 
to be made: 
1) The 2004 IFRS figures are reported one year after the NGAAP figures.10 Since more 
accurate information is available at the end of 2005, the IFRS figures for 2004 may be based 
on more precise accounting estimates than the NGAAP figures. For instance, if a business 
segment is for sale in 2005 and not in 2004, the 2004 IFRS statements would have reported 
this as a discontinuous operation to give comparable numbers to those for 2005, while it 
would have been reported as continuous operation in the original 2004-report. Consequently, 
the IFRS figures may be more value-relevant than their corresponding NGAAP figures. This 
bias in favor of IFRS is larger for the value-relevance of earnings components than for net 
earnings, as the net is not affected by reclassifications within the income statement (unless it 
affects 'dirty surplus'). 
                                                 
10 From 2004 to 2005, three firms shifted their reporting currency from NOK to USD or EUR. This may affect 
the scale, making the NGAAP figures more value-relevant in the price regression, but hardly in the return and in 
the abnormal return regression. Table 2 reveals that the effect on the average stock price is only 1.4%, implying 
only a negligible influence on scale even for the price regression. 
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2) Since 2005 was the first year of implementation, the IFRS accounting figures in 2004 
may include non-recurring implementation effects, although they should be reflected in the 
opening balance sheet on January 1, 2004. Consequently, the IFRS figures may be less value-
relevant because they contain implementation noise not present in the NGAAP figures. We 
control for this effect by splitting earnings into a recurring and a non-recurring component. If 
implementation effects create additional noise, this will contribute to making the non-
recurring income less value-relevant according to IFRS as compared to NGAAP. Recurring 
income will be less affected. 
3) Prices are quoted in the stock market based on available information. By the end of 
2004, the OSE was able to price the NGAAP figures directly, as they were to a large degree 
publicly available, and to price the IFRS figures indirectly, as these figures had to be fully 
anticipated. Hence, the outlined test of value-relevance may be biased in favor of NGAAP. 
We control for this effect by adjusting for stock market inefficiency, utilizing the procedure 
outlined in Aboody, Hughes and Liu (2002). In our case, this procedure implies that stock 
market valuation is delayed for one year, until the end of 2005, thus making the IFRS figures 
publicly available. The values are discounted back to 2004, at the time when value-relevance 
differences are tested. 
Our sample is reduced to 130 observations when value-relevance is evaluated by return 
and abnormal return regressions due to lacking data when calculating the change variables 
entering these two regressions, see Panel B of Table 1. With a limited sample size of 145 and 
130, we do not remove potential outliers.11 However, we shall analyze the effect of extreme 
observations as a robustness test, see Table 10. Table 2 presents our descriptive statistics. 
                                                 
11 A potential criticism is that only 145 or 130 observations give little statistical power to reject the null hypothe-
sis of IFRS and NGAAP are equally value-relevant. This criticism is correct if we were analyzing a sample and 
could expand the sample size. In our case, we have all observations available. The sample could be expanded by 
including other countries, but this approach will change the carefully selected benchmark for testing the value-
relevance of adopting IFRS. Notice that if the universe of observations is studied, all differences are significant 
in principle – no tests are needed. However, we will not interpret our sample as the universe of observations, so 
tests are performed. 
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Panel A and B describe the variables entering the price, the return and the abnormal return 
regressions, respectively. 
 
- INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE – 
 
Based on the average value of stock price, book value and earnings per share, the price/ 
book-ratio is 1.527 according to IFRS and 1.534 according to NGAAP. The price/earnings-
ratio is 11.622 according to IFRS and 12.763 according to NGAAP. Both multiples are higher 
according to NGAAP than IFRS, mainly because the average earnings per share reported ac-
cording to NGAAP is somewhat lower than the corresponding IFRS figure; 5.670 versus 
6.218. Earnings per share is 9.7% higher according to IFRS than NGAAP due to 5.0% higher 
net operating income, 31.8% lower net financial costs and 5.9% higher net non-recurring in-
come. The operating revenue per share of IFRS is 6.1% below the corresponding value for 
NGAAP. This stems primarily from the reclassification from continuous to discontinuous 
operations in retrospect, which are reported as non-recurring. This also reduces operating 
costs per share. The net operating margin increases from 5.0% to 5.6%, suggesting that IFRS 
allow for reporting less operating costs. According to IFRS, and unlike NGAAP, goodwill is 
not amortized; instead it is tested annually for impairment.  
To avoid operating with a relatively small tax component in our regressions, as would 
have been consistent with the format of the income statements, the tax (both payable and 
change in deferred) has simply been allocated to each income component, cf. Penman (2006). 
NOI, net operating income, or NOPAT, net operating profit after taxes, is the recurring oper-
ating revenue, ORE, with the deduction of recurring operating cost, OCO, including allocated 
operating taxes. Net financial costs, NFC, is recurring financial cost less recurring financial 
revenue plus the tax advantage of having net financial debt. Net unusual income, NUI, con-
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sists of non-recurring operating income less non-recurring financial cost less allocated taxes 
on these items. On average, NUI is positive and relatively large in 2004. Operating items clas-
sified as unusual are impairment losses on fixed and intangible assets, restructuring charges, 
huge losses or gains on sale of fixed and intangible assets, net income from discontinuous 
operations and other operating items indicated in the financial statement as special. Other op-
erating items are classified as usual and included in the NOI. Financial items classified as 
unusual are impairment losses, currency losses and gains, huge losses and gains obtained by 
selling net financial assets and financial items indicated in the financial statements as special. 
Other net financial costs are classified as usual and included in the NFC. 
Panel B of Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for variables in the return and the ab-
normal return regressions. In 2004, the average stock market return is 29.2%, while the aver-
age estimated abnormal return is -1.9% (the abnormal return for all firms listed on the OSE in 
2004 is, of course, zero. High stock market returns are consistent with non-recurring gains and 
thus with reporting a positive and relatively high net unusual income per share. The earnings 
per share in 2003 deflated by that year's stock price, et-1 = Et-1/Pt-1, is -1.3% both according to 
IFRS and to NGAAP. There is available accounting data for 2003 only according to NGAAP, 
and these figures are taken as the basis for computing changes in 2004, both when changes are 
computed in line with IFRS and in line with NGAAP. Consequently, the level of deflated net 
operating income, net financial cost and net unusual income are identical for the two reporting 
regimes. 
The change in price-deflated earnings in 2004, Δet = ΔEt/Pt-1, is 9.3% according to IFRS 
and 7.9% according to NGAAP. This difference could also be traced from the fact that the 
deflated change in net operating income, Δnui, is 2.1% according to IFRS and 1.2% according 
to NGAAP; the deflated change in net financial cost, Δnfc, is -0.8% according to IFRS and     
-0.6% according to NGAAP, while the deflated change in net non-recurring or unusual in-
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come, Δnui, is 6.4% according to IFRS and 6.0% according to NGAAP. In 2004, the account-
ing return on market-based equity, Et/Pt-1, is 8.0% according to IFRS and 6.6% according to 
NGAAP. Thus, the firms seem to be more profitable according to their IFRS figures, see Sec-
tion 2. 
 
5. Test Results and Analyses 
To test whether IFRS financial statements are more value-relevant than NGAAP financial 
statements, we start by calculating binary correlations between market variables, i.e. price, 
return or abnormal return, and the corresponding accounting variables. Next, we utilize multi-
ple OLS regressions, i.e. Model (1), (2) and (3), in which the accounting-based variables 
specified according to the two reporting regimes enter simultaneously, to explain the corre-
sponding market-based variable.12 Pairs of unconditional IFRS and NGAAP regressions are 
also extended by their conditional or marginal counterparts, for instance is Model (3) ex-
tended to Model (4). Finally, the robustness for emphasizing different components of value-
relevance, such as firm size, intangible assets intensity and firm profitability, is analyzed by 
using multiple WLS regressions. 
 
5.1 Binary Correlations 
Panel A of Table 3 reports binary correlations for the price regression (1) with no adjustment 
for possible market inefficiency. The lower left part of the matrix reports Pearson correlation 
coefficients for the IFRS figures and the upper right part reports the correlations for the 
NGAAP figures. 
 
                                                 
12 The t-values of the OLS coefficients are based on heteroskedasticity-adjusted estimates of the standard devia-
tions, see White (1980). Since our sample size N is less than 250, we utilize the HC3-estimate, see MacKinnon 
and White (1985) and Long and Erwin (2000). 
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- INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE - 
 
The correlation between stock price and book value per share is 88.9% according to 
IFRS and 84.5% according to NGAAP, suggesting an R2 of 79.0% and 71.5%, respectively. 
The stock price seems to be more strongly correlated with the balance sheet for IFRS figures. 
The difference in R2 of 7.5 percentage points is significantly different from zero at the 10%-
level.13 The correlation between stock price and earnings per share is 73.5% according to 
IFRS and 78.7% according to NGAAP, suggesting an R2 of 54.0% and 61.9%, respectively. 
The stock price seems to be more strongly correlated with the income statement when 
NGAAP are used. Nevertheless, the difference in R2 of 7.9 percentage points is not signifi-
cant. This result is consistent with the claim that NGAAP are more earnings-oriented than 
IFRS, while IFRS are more balance-oriented than NGAAP, cf. the discussion of this differ-
ence in conceptual orientation in Section 2. 
Panel B of Table 3 reports that the correlation between unadjusted stock market return 
and the initial price-deflated level of earnings is -0.076, according to both IFRS and NGAAP, 
suggesting an R2 of merely 0.6%. The correlation between stock return and price-deflated 
change in earnings is 0.435 according to IFRS and 0.434 according to NGAAP, suggesting an 
R2 of approximately 19% in both cases. Return correlations provide no significant difference 
in value-relevance. Furthermore, the correlation between unadjusted abnormal return and 
change in earnings is 0.475 according to IFRS and 0.479 according to NGAAP, implying an 
R2 of 22.6% and 22.9%, respectively. Again, there is no significant difference between the 
                                                 
13 The t-value of R2 and adjusted R2 are based on the standard deviation found in Cramer (1987), and the t-value 
of differences in adjusted R2 is based on the assumption of two independent samples, see Harris, Lang and 
Möller (1994, Footnote 38). The independency assumption makes the test conservative (as long as the unmeas-
ured correlation is positive), suggesting that the power is higher than indicated by the reported p-value indication 
asterisk. However, the effect of the independency assumption could be explored by Hausman’s specification test, 
allowing a more general covariance matrix, though positive definite, cf. e.g. Green (2008, pp. 208-209). The 
Vuong test based on Lien and Vuong (1987) and Vuong (1989) is postponed to the return and abnormal return 
regressions as the price regressions contains three pair of observations with shifting exchange rates, see Footnote 
10 and 15. 
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two reporting regimes. The same finding appears when analyzing the underlying components 
of the earnings change, i.e. Δnoi, Δnfc and Δnui. Before concluding, however, the correlation 
results should be examined with all accounting variables included simultaneously, i.e. by per-
forming multiple regressions. 
We observe from Panel B of Table 3 a positive serial correlation in abnormal returns of 
0.384, suggesting that 14.7% of the variation in the following year's abnormal return is ex-
plained by the current year's abnormal return. Furthermore, there is a significant correlation 
between the price-deflated change in net unusual income and the following year's abnormal 
return, which is consistent with the post-earnings announcement drift revealed by Bernard and 
Thomas (1989). The coefficient is 0.199 or 0.207, depending on whether IFRS or NGAAP are 
used; suggesting that approximately 4% of next year's abnormal return is explained by the 
current net non-recurring income. These findings challenge the pricing efficiency of Norwe-
gian capital markets and underscore that regressions should be adjusted for possible effects of 
an inefficient market by following the procedure developed by Aboody, Hughes and Liu 
(2002). 
 
5.2 Multiple OLS Price Regressions 
Table 4 presents price regressions based on both IFRS and NGAAP. Panel A reports the un-
adjusted price regression and Panel B gives the inefficiency-adjusted price regression with 
book value per share and different decompositions of earnings per share as explanatory vari-
ables. 
 
- INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE - 
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We learn that the results from the inefficiency-adjusted price regression are similar to 
the corresponding unadjusted regression. The adjusted R2 increases in the inefficiency-
adjusted regressions; the difference of 2.8 percentage points on average is, however, not sig-
nificant. The regression coefficient of the book value becomes closer to 1 and the regression 
coefficient of earnings becomes larger after opening for accounting information being slowly 
incorporated into the stock price. This is consistent with the inefficiency-adjustment effects on 
the price regression observed in Aboody, Hughes and Liu (2002; Table 2). 
In the inefficiency-adjusted price regression, NGAAP seem to be more value-relevant 
than IFRS, the difference in adjusted R2 is 3.1 percentage points in favor of NGAAP. The 
response coefficient of earnings is higher for NGAAP than for IFRS, whereas the response 
coefficient of equity is lower. Since the coefficients are correlated across reporting regimes, a 
Hausman test could be used, see e.g. Green (2008, pp. 208-209). This test should only be per-
formed if the covariance matrix is positive definite, which needs not be the case in small sam-
ples. If a positive definite covariance matrix is secured, e.g. by assuming homoskedastic error 
terms, the null hypothesis of no systematic difference in coefficients is rejected at the 1%-
level. This indicates that the observed difference could be more significant than what is re-
ported from the standard t-tests in Table 4, in which no correlation implicitly is assumed. 
When earnings per share are split into net operating income, net financial costs and net un-
usual income per share, the difference in adjusted R2 increases at 5.4 percentage points, which 
is significantly different from zero at the 1%-level. No regression coefficient in the IFRS and 
NGAAP regressions is significantly different according to the simple t-test. The standard 
Chow test (represented by the F-value), testing for jointly differences in the coefficients, 
comes up with the same conclusion. On the other hand, the Hausman test reveals that the 
structural difference in the coefficients is significant at the 1%-level, again after securing a 
positive definite covariance matrix. Based on inefficiency-adjusted price regressions, we are 
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thus not able to conclude that IFRS represent a significant improvement in value-relevance as 
compared to NGAAP. 
A supplementary approach to evaluating the value-relevance of adopting IFRS is to ana-
lyze the marginal increase in value-relevance for stock market investors having access to the 
NGAAP accounting figures and then obtaining the IFRS figures, see Model (4). Table 5 pre-
sents the results for the inefficiency-adjusted regressions, where changes in book value and 
earnings due to IFRS adoption are separate explanatory variables. 
 
- INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE - 
 
According to Panel A, the change in equity and earnings from NGAAP to IFRS has had 
a marginal effect on the adjusted R2 of 2.9 percentage points. Horton and Serafeim (2007), 
employing a similar regression model, observe a marginal increase of 0.7 percentage points 
relative to UKGAAP, see their Table 5. As in Horton and Serafeim, the marginal increase in 
adjusted R2 and the restatement coefficients in our study are not significant. However, when 
tested jointly, the hypothesis that all restatement coefficients are zero is rejected at the 10%-
level. Still, no individual coefficients are significant. Horton and Serafeim find no significant 
effect caused by restating the book value, but a significant positive effect at the 2%-level 
caused by restating earnings from UKGAAP to IFRS. 
When we replace the change in earnings due to the adoption of IFRS with its underlying 
components, the marginal increase in adjusted R2 increases at 4.3 or 4.5 percentage points, 
which is significant at the 10%-level. The joint hypothesis of zero coefficients is rejected at 
the 5%-level. However, none of the individual restatements coefficients are significantly dif-
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ferent from zero, making it difficult to pinpoint what exactly leads to the increased value-
relevance.14 
Panel B reports the result of running stepwise regressions with forward inclusion of the 
IFRS adoption variables. The starting point is the regression with NGAAP book value and 
earnings as explanatory variables. Next, an IFRS adoption variable is added if, and only if, the 
yielding coefficient is significant. Only the restatement of the book value qualifies, since its 
regression coefficient is significant at the 1%-level, while all the variables related to the re-
statement of earnings do not. Hence, the marginal value-relevance of the adoption of IFRS 
relative to NGAAP is related to the restatement of the equity book value and thereby to the 
balance sheet. 
The analyses based on price regressions lead to the following conclusion: When evalu-
ated unconditionally, the value-relevance of NGAAP is significantly higher than the value-
relevance of IFRS, as measured by the difference in adjusted R2 for the two reporting regimes. 
The value-relevance of the income statement (earnings) decreases, but the value-relevance of 
the balance sheet (equity) increases. Furthermore, IFRS have a marginal improvement in val-
ue-relevance relative to NGAAP, i.e. investors having access to the NGAAP financial state-
ments also find valuable additional information in the corresponding IFRS financial state-
ments. Of particular relevance is the restatement of the book value of equity – a result consis-
tent with the view that more fair values in the balance sheet increase value-relevance. This is 
an intuitively appealing result. 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 Notice that the regression coefficient for the change in net financial costs due to the implementation of IFRS 
relative to NGAAP is significantly positive at the 10%-level in one of the two regressions in Panel A of Table 5. 
This result is counterintuitive. If we run the same regressions with less weight on 'extreme' observations, the 
coefficient is still positive, although not significant (t-value = 1.021). 
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5.3 Multiple OLS Return Regressions 
Table 6 contains the results of the return regression (2). Panel A presents the unadjusted re-
turn regressions and Panel B presents the inefficiency-adjusted return regressions, in which 
price-deflated earnings and change in earnings have been decomposed into their underlying 
incomes. 
 
- INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE - 
 
We learn that the results from the inefficiency-adjusted return regressions are similar to 
the corresponding unadjusted regressions. However, the adjusted R2 goes down in the ineffi-
ciency-adjusted regressions; the difference is on average 1.6 percentage points, which is not 
significant. This effect of adding noise questions the effectiveness of the inefficiency-
adjustment procedure, and shows that the adjustment may come at a cost. Still, both the re-
gression coefficients of price-deflated earnings level and earnings change become higher after 
opening for accounting information is being slowly incorporated into stock prices. This ob-
servation is consistent with the adjustment effects observed in Aboody, Hughes and Liu 
(2002; Table 3). 
According to both the unadjusted return regressions and the three inefficiency-adjusted 
return regressions, there is no difference in adjusted R2 due to reporting, neither according to 
IFRS nor according to NGAAP.15 The change in accounting return on market-based equity is 
as value-relevant according to IFRS as it is according to NGAAP, while the level of the ac-
counting return is only partly value-relevant in both cases. The lower significance of level 
return of market-based equity may be related to the fact that the return on the book value of 
                                                 
15 The t-value of adjusted R2 is based on the standard deviation found in Cramer (1987), and the t-value of dif-
ferences in adjusted R2 is based on Lien and Vuong (1987) and Vuong (1989), since the stock return is the same 
for the IFRS and NGAAP firms. The finding of no significant differences is confirmed by Hausman’s specifica-
tion test. 
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equity in 2003 on average was negative, cf. Table 2, Panel B. Negative earnings is more tran-
sitory and therefore less value-relevant than positive earnings, see Hayn (1995). The change 
from 2003 to 2004 was 9.3%, and its significant correlation with the stock market return is 
29.2%, cf. Panel B of Table 3. 
From Table 7 we learn that the implementation of IFRS yields no significant marginal 
value-relevance when measured by the adjusted R2 – even though the largest change in R2 is 
about 6.4 percentage points. 
 
- INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE - 
 
However, when we analyze the structural change in the coefficients due to the adoption 
of IFRS, one result stands clear.16 The change in deflated net operating income is highly val-
ue-relevant. This result is also found when we split the deflated net operating income into 
deflated operating revenue and costs. It seems that IFRS, on the margin, give more value-
relevant information about the operating revenue recognition and expensing relative to the 
corresponding NGAAP figures. 
Our analysis based on return regressions leads to the following conclusion: The value-
relevance of NGAAP is not significantly different from the value-relevance of IFRS, when 
evaluated unconditionally. Implementing IFRS increases value-relevance relative to NGAAP 
due to the change in net operating income, and thereby also for operating revenue and cost, 
including operational taxes. 
 
 
                                                 
16 Notice that the regression coefficient of the change in net unusual income due to the implementation of IFRS 
relative to NGAAP is significantly negative at the 10%-level in one of the two regressions in Panel A of Table 7. 
This result is counterintuitive. If we run the same regression with less weight on 'extreme' observations, the coef-
ficient is still negative, although not significant (t-value = -1.539). 
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5.4 Multiple OLS Abnormal Return Regressions 
The results from running the abnormal return regression (3) are presented in Table 8. Panel A 
contains the regressions explaining current year's abnormal return, expanded by a factor con-
taining next year's abnormal return, while Panel B contains the regression explaining current 
year's abnormal return. 
 
- INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE - 
 
Unlike in Table 4 and Table 6, the effect of adjusting abnormal return for possible stock 
market inefficiency is questionable. Notice that the adjusted R2 falls on average from 22.2% 
in Panel B to 16.1% in Panel A, a significant decrease of 6.1 percentage points. The cost of 
the inefficiency-adjustment is that it may in this case add considerable noise, so we choose to 
present the results from the unadjusted abnormal return regressions. A robustness test will be 
employed to test whether the obtained results also hold in the inefficiency-adjusted case. 
We observe from Table 8 that the result from our return regressions is confirmed. There 
is no significant difference between the value-relevance of IFRS and NGAAP.17 Nevertheless, 
the change in accounting return on market-based equity is highly relevant for explaining ab-
normal stock market return. This result is driven by changes in operating revenue, costs and 
hence net operating income and by changes in net non-recurring or unusual income.18 The 
effect caused by net financial costs is less significant or even not significant, even though the 
coefficient is large. 
                                                 
17 However, Hausman’s specification test reveals that the structural coefficient differences when the return is 
explained by deflated changes in net operating income, net financial costs and net unusual income are signifi-
cant. 
18 The significance of non-recurring items such as write-offs is consistent with the findings of for example Fran-
cis, Hanna and Vincent (1996). Although significant, the weight on non-recurring income is considerable less 
than and in this respect less value-relevant than recurring net operating income. This observation is consistent 
with the findings of Elliott and Hanna (1996). Non-recurring items are less persistent and hence less value-
relevant. 
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Our result from the return regressions is also confirmed in Table 9, as we observe sig-
nificant marginal contributions of adopting IFRS due to the restatement of the net operating 
income, cf. Model (4). Both the reconciliation adjustment of the operating revenue and costs 
are significant. 
 
- INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE - 
 
The finding that reconciliation adjustment of operating costs from NGAAP to IFRS is 
value-relevant is consistent with the results of Horton and Serafeim (2007). Among the ac-
counting items causing value-relevance differences between UKGAAP and IFRS is goodwill, 
making this, or more generally, accounting for intangible assets a candidate for causing value-
relevance differences between NGAAP and IFRS, cf. Section 2 for an overview of the ac-
counting differences and Section 5.5 for further analyses into the sources of what is causing 
value-relevance differences. 
The analysis based on abnormal return regressions leads to the following conclusion: 
There is little evidence that the difference in value-relevance between IFRS and NGAAP is 
significant when they are evaluated unconditionally. Based on the marginal increase, IFRS are 
incremental value-relevant relative to NGAAP, which is caused by the reconciliation adjust-
ment of net operating income, both operating revenue and operating costs. Our final analysis 
is to investigate whether these results are driven by a few extreme observations or by underly-
ing characteristics like industries, firm size, intangible asset intensity and firm profitability, 
which also will shed light on the robustness of our results. Notice that the effect of non-
recurring items is controlled for directly in the partition of the price-deflated earnings change. 
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5.5 Robustness Tests and Further Analyses of the Sources of Identified Value-
Relevance Differences 
Our first robustness test is to investigate whether the results in Table 8 and 9 are driven by a 
few extreme observations. Since removing potential outliers has the effect of reducing noise, 
we reintroduce the noisier inefficiency-adjusted abnormal return variable as an alternative 
approach in order to focus on the unadjusted abnormal return variable, cf. the discussion of 
the results in Table 8, Panel A versus B. Panel A of Table 10 reports the inefficiency-adjusted 
results when the 1% highest and 1% lowest Dfbetas of all accounting-based observations in 
Model (3) and (4) are excluded, given that the outcome is a matched set of observations be-
tween IFRS and NGAAP. Dfbeta is a measure of each observation's influence on the coeffi-
cient estimates, variable by variable. Panel B reports the corresponding results when the 5% 
highest observations of Cook's D are dropped. D is a measure of how influential each obser-
vation is on the regression's overall outcome. 
 
- INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE - 
 
In Panel A of Table 10, we learn that the two-sample unconditional comparison test re-
veals no difference in the coefficient structure between the IFRS and NGAAP regressions, as 
previously found in Table 8. However, the regression coefficient of the change in net opera-
tional income is 2.088, as compared to 1.257 in Table 9. The former estimate is significant at 
the 1%-level and the result of the F-test for the joint hypothesis that all IFRS related variables 
are zero, is also significant. 
In Panel B, we report no difference in the coefficient structure between the IFRS and 
NGAAP regressions from the two-sample unconditional comparison test, as previously found 
in Table 8. We observe that the regression coefficient of the change in net operating income is 
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estimated at 1.833 and that it is significant at the 1%-level. This improvement, as compared to 
the results of Table 9, suggests that the value-relevance of adjusting net operating income 
from NGAAP to IFRS does not depend on a few observations with a substantial impact. 
However, our findings and conclusions are strengthened in significance when removing po-
tential outliers. The reintroduction of the inefficiency-adjustment introduces some noise and 
thus reduces the statistical significance of the results, but not to such an extent that the results 
become insignificant. 
The second robustness test is to use a random coefficient model to control for potential 
industry effects (see e.g. Green (2008, pp. 222-238) for a discussion of mixed models). The 
firm observations are divided into 11 broad industries. The regression coefficients are esti-
mated to include a fixed universal term and a (random) term varying across industries. We do 
not table the results, i.e. the fixed coefficients. But our finding that the marginal value-
relevance difference between IFRS and NGAAP is driven by the reconciliation adjustment of 
the net operating income is also significant at the 1%-level within this type of regression 
models. 
Our third robustness test is to analyze whether firm size affects the results. Size is 
measured by the logarithm of market value.19 The results are only reported, not tabled. We 
find no changes in the differences in value-relevance between IFRS and NGAAP for neither 
large nor small firms, while the differences for net operating income are significant for both 
large and small firms. We perform statistical tests for possible differences when weighting 
small versus large firms and find no significant differences appear. Size is no driver of value-
relevance differences in our sample. 
                                                 
19 The value-relevance of large firms' financial statements is expected to be higher than for small firms. Large 
firms have more intensive analyst following, suggesting that accounting information is more easily incorporated 
into stock market value. In addition, small firms are more likely to report losses, suggesting less value-relevance, 
see Collins, Pincus and Xie (1999). However, our sample indicates no difference in value-relevance on the basis 
of firm size. 
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The fourth robustness test is to analyze whether the intangible asset intensity may influ-
ence the results.20 Table 11 reports. Panel A shows the abnormal return regression results 
when the regression is weighted according to reported intangible assets (in percentage of total 
assets), while Panel B presents the results when the regression is weighted according to the 
inverse, i.e. according to fixed and financial assets. 
 
- INSERT TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE - 
 
Once again, our results from the previous subsection pass the robustness test. The coef-
ficient of the net operating income is significant in both Panel A and Panel B. However, in 
Panel A, the F-test becomes significant at the 1%-level, suggesting that the additional insight 
provided by IFRS to some extent may be related to intangible assets. Panel C performs formal 
tests for differences between the coefficients in Panel A and Panel B.21 One of them turns out 
to be significant at the 5%-level, i.e. intangible-intensive firms disclose a more value-relevant 
net operating income according to IFRS than according to NGAAP. For instance, annual im-
pairment tests according to IFRS may be a more appropriate way of accounting for goodwill 
than annual amortization according to NGAAP.22 More capitalization of development expen-
                                                 
20 Lev and Zarowin (1999) argue that the value-relevance of financial reporting has been affected negatively 
because the importance of unreported intangible assets has grown over time. The reason is that expenditures on 
most intangibles are expensed as incurred and not treated as investments that are recognized as assets in the 
balance sheet. Capitalization of intangibles is highly value-relevant, see Lev and Sougiannis (1996) and Aboody 
and Lev (1998). Our findings confirm that firms with a high degree of intangible asset recognition have more 
value-relevant accounting numbers than do firms with a low degree, cf. Panel A versus Panel B. 
21 To check the robustness of this result, we also divide the sample into two parts – firms with more than 10% 
intangible assets and firms with less than 10% intangible assets. The 56 most intangible-intensive firms have a 
coefficient from net operating income at 9.213 while the other 74 firms have 1.206. The difference of 8.007 has a 
t-value of 2.628 and is significant at the 5%-level. The difference in adjusted R2 between the two samples is 
0.407 with a t-value of 3.535, which is significant at the 1%-level. However, we believe that weighting the sam-
ple monotonically reflects the contents of the data set more appropriately than 'arbitrarily' splitting the data into 
two parts. 
22 Nevertheless, direct tests of the value-relevance of goodwill impairment losses versus systematic amortization 
indicate that amortization dominates impairment, see e.g. Chambers (2006) and Li and Meeks (2006) for some 
recent evidence. These findings challenge our claim on goodwill impairments and pinpoint capitalization and 
subsequent amortization of development expenditures expedited to produce future benefits as the most likely 
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ditures according to IFRS than NGAAP may cause the same result, as the option in NGAAP 
to capitalize rarely has been used. Our finding that IFRS introduce an additional value-
relevance relative to NGAAP, due to differences in the reporting of intangible assets, is con-
sistent with the finding of Horton and Serafeim (2007) that the reconciliation goodwill ad-
justment from UKGAAP to IFRS is value-relevant. 
Our final robustness test is to analyze whether firm profitability may affect the results.23 
Table 12 reports. Panel A presents the abnormal return regression results when the regression 
is weighted according to the rank of the accounting return on the book value of equity, while 
Panel B presents the results when the regression is weighted according to the inverse, i.e. ac-
cording to the rank of the negative value of return on equity, in order to measure the degree of 
inverse profitability. 
 
- INSERT TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE - 
 
Table 12 shows that the value-relevance of IFRS is higher for profitable firms, while the 
value-relevance of NGAAP is higher for unprofitable firms. The Voung test yields signifi-
cance at the 1%- and 10%-level, respectively. But our result of an improved value-relevance 
from IFRS, caused by additional information reported through the net operating income, is 
replicated only when more weight is given to unprofitable firms – and not when more weight 
is given to profitable firms. This may seem as a contradiction. However, IFRS may be more 
adequate for profitable intangible-intensive firms than NGAAP, whereas for unprofitable in-
tangible-intensive firms, NGAAP have the same quality as IFRS; although IFRS are margin-
                                                                                                                                                        
explanation for our observation, see Lev and Sougiannis (1996) and Aboody and Lev (1998) for consistent evi-
dence on the value-relevance of intangible asset capitalization. 
23 Hayn (1996) demonstrates that firms reporting negative earnings have less earnings response coefficients than 
those who do not. This finding suggests that value-relevance of financial reporting may be affected by the profit-
ability of the firm. Panel A and Panel B of Table 12, however, yield no uniform difference between firms with 
high and low profitability. 
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ally value-relevant. Panel C demonstrates that the difference in marginal value-relevance of 
IFRS between profitable and unprofitable firms is not significant, again suggesting that we 
cannot reject stability.24 
Summarizing the robustness results that net operational income has marginal value-
relevance when adopting IFRS relative to NGAAP, we find that this result is valid particularly 
for firms with relatively high intangible asset intensity, which tend to be unprofitable. This 
suggests that IFRS are marginally more powerful in accounting for intangible assets. Uncon-
ditionally, IFRS earnings are also more adequate than NGAAP earnings for intangible-
intensive firms, which tend to be profitable. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Our main conclusion is that the value-relevance of key accounting figures prepared according 
to IFRS is not superior to the corresponding figures prepared according to NGAAP, when 
they are evaluated unconditionally and conservatively as two independent samples. This result 
is robust against empirical specifications in which firm size, intangible asset intensity, profit-
ability and the degree of non-recurring items are controlled for. 
When analyzing the marginal value-relevance of adopting IFRS for firms already re-
porting according to NGAAP, these results appear: 
 Stock holders' equity reported according to IFRS is on the margin more value-relevant 
as compared to a balance sheet reported according to NGAAP, since more fair values 
increase value-relevance. 
                                                 
24 Splitting the sample into two parts, according to whether firms have a positive or negative return on equity, 
yields this result: The coefficient of the net operating income is 3.003 in the sample of 34 unprofitable firms and 
1.296 in the sample of 96 profitable firms. The difference of 1.707 is not significant, which is consistent with the 
weighted regression result. 
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 A normalized net operating income reported according to IFRS is on the margin more 
value-relevant as compared to a corresponding NGAAP figure, especially for intensive 
intangible assets firms. 
For firms with a high degree of intangible assets, the main difference between IFRS and 
NGAAP is the reporting of goodwill and R&D-expenditures, cf. the overview in Section 2. 
Although it is not substantiated directly by our statistical tests, we believe that IFRS are mar-
ginally more value-relevant than NGAAP due to goodwill impairments instead of goodwill 
amortization. Acquisition cost allocated to goodwill remains in the balance sheet, making the 
IFRS balance sheet more value-relevant on the margin. In addition, the marginal value-
relevance result might prevail due to more capitalizing of development expenditures at costs 
in the balance sheet according to IFRS, relative to the practice of expensing such expenditures 
according to NGAAP, even though NGAAP gives an option to capitalize. More assets and 
measuring them at fair values in the balance sheet increases value-relevance (cf. the price re-
gression result), and to the extent that they are measured at cost, they also contribute to the 
value-relevance of net operating income (cf. the return and abnormal return regression re-
sults). 
The advantage of adopting IFRS has been widely discussed and questioned in countries 
characterized by having a developed accounting regulation prior to IFRS. Although our em-
pirical findings show that the unconditional value-relevance of IFRS is not larger than that of 
NGAAP, and, thus, raise some doubt about the superiority of the balance sheet orientation, 
our marginal dependency findings demonstrate that IFRS have marginal value-relevance rela-
tive to NGAAP. We believe that these benefits might very well outweigh the implementation 
costs, especially when taking into account the positive effects of a harmonization leading to 
increased value-relevance in countries with a less developed accounting system, an advantage 
for all investors investing in the international capital market.  
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Tables 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Sample Selection 
 
    
 
Panel A 
GAAP Used by OSE Listed Firms in 2004 and 2005 
 
    
 2004 2005 
    
GAAP Initially Reported 
IFRS Restatements in 
2005  
    
    
IFRS 2 1 188 
NGAAP 167 145 16 
USGAAP 10 2 10 
SGAAP 4 4 0 
CGAAP 2 0 4 
DKGAAP 1 1 0 
HKGAAP 1 0 1 
UKGAAP 1 1 0 
    
    
Listed on OSE 188  219 
    
 
Panel B 
Sample 
 
 
Observations – Full sample 
   
Level 
 
 
Change 
 
    
IFRS restatements from NGAAP 145 130 
    
List of reporting regimes used on the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE): IFRS = International Financial Reporting Stan-
dards, NGAAP = Norwegian Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, USGAAP = United States Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles, SGAAP = Swedish Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, CGAAP = Cana-
dian Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, DKGAAP = Danish Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, 
HKGAAP = Hong Kong Generally Accepted Accounting Principles and UKGAAP = United Kingdom Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles. In 2005, 145 companies listed on OSE restated their financial statements for 2004 
according to IFRS. These statements were originally prepared according to NGAAP. This means that 145 financial 
statements are available both according to IFRS and NGAAP. When computing changes in accounting variables 
from 2003 to 2004, the NGAAP financial statements for 2003 are used as a basis for the 2004 changes both accord-
ing to IFRS and NGAAP. 15 of the 145 companies are registered without accounting data for 2003. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
           
 
Panel A 
Price Regression Variables 
 
IFRS NGAAP N = 145 Mean St.dev. Q1 Med. Q3 Mean St.dev. Q1 Med. Q3 
           
P 72.264 100.403 8.890 28.500 87.500 72.365 100.333 9.100 28.500 87.500 
B 41.181 65.227 2.465 12.821 43.084 41.489 63.988 2.857 11.964 48.790 
E 6.218 13.757 0.003 1.430 5.915 5.670 13.869 -0.048 1.373 4.883 
           
ORE 87.550 213.631 4.184 21.747 79.486 93.200 237.395 5.548 23.325 81.084 
OCO 82.677 208.011 4.082 19.278 70.971 88.561 233.287 6.288 21.869 74.006 
           
NOI 4.873 8.738 0.014 1.287 5.855 4.639 8.439 0.015 1.169 5.612 
NFC 0.457 2.398 -0.002 0.015 0.416 0.670 2.598 0.000 0.030 0.549 
NUI 1.802 12.303 -0.059 0.000 0.418 1.701 11.754 -0.216 -0.002 0.336 
           
 
Panel B 
Return and Abnormal Return Regression Variables 
 
IFRS NGAAP N = 130 Mean St.dev. Q1 Med. Q3 Mean St.dev. Q1 Med. Q3 
           
r 0.292 0.433 0.072 0.254 0.504 0.292 0.433 0.072 0.254 0.504 
           
e -0.013 0.265 -0.010 0.042 0.080 -0.013 0.265 -0.010 0.042 0.080 
Δe 0.093 0.231 -0.011 0.024 0.094 0.079 0.233 -0.008 0.019 0.073 
           
ore 1.618 2.466 0.402 0.812 2.017 1.618 2.466 0.402 0.812 2.017 
oco 1.576 2.406 0.355 0.701 1.999 1.576 2.406 0.355 0.701 1.999 
           
noi 0.042 0.127 -0.004 0.039 0.082 0.042 0.127 -0.004 0.039 0.082 
nfc 0.023 0.050 0.000 0.006 0.024 0.023 0.050 0.000 0.006 0.024 
nui -0.033 0.172 -0.015 0.000 0.009 -0.033 0.172 -0.015 0.000 0.009 
           
Δore 0.041 0.646 -0.126 0.013 0.113 0.165 0.565 -0.069 0.035 0.163 
Δoco 0.021 0.650 -0.138 0.008 0.099 0.153 0.579 -0.075 0.050 0.171 
           
Δnoi 0.021 0.099 -0.015 0.010 0.050 0.012 0.119 -0.020 0.010 0.044 
Δnfc -0.008 0.028 -0.009 0.000 0.002 -0.006 0.026 -0.006 0.000 0.003 
Δnui 0.064 0.196 -0.003 0.002 0.044 0.060 0.187 -0.003 0.000 0.026 
           
ar -0.019 0.456 -0.240 -0.057 0.132 -0.019 0.456 -0.240 -0.057 0.132 
           
P = the stock price at the end of year t, B = the book value per share at the end of t minus the earnings per share 
during t, E = the earnings or net income per share during t, ORE = operating revenue per share, OCO = operating 
cost per share, including allocated operating tax, NOI = net operating income (or net operating profit after tax, 
NOPAT) per share; NFC = net financial costs per share, i.e. financial cost after financial revenue and tax benefit, 
NUI = net unusual or non-recurring income per share, r is the stock market return and ar = abnormal return in year 
t. Δ denotes changes in a variable. The variables in small letters e, ore, oco, noi, nfc and nui are the price-deflated 
variables corresponding to capital letters, i.e. e = E/P, ore = ORE/P, oco = OCO/P, noi = NOI/P, nfc = NFC/P and 
nui = NUI/P. 
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Table 3 
Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 
Panel A 
Price Regression Variables – 
IFRS Lower Left Part; NGAAP Upper Right Part 
 
 
N = 145 
 
  P  B  E NOI  NFC  NUI  
         
P   1.000***  0.845***  0.787***  0.883***  0.201**  0.339***  
B   0.889***  1.000***  0.688***  0.699***  0.167**  0.348***  
E   0.735***  0.724***  1.000***  0.593***   0.176**  0.793***  
NOI   0.815***  0.756***  0.512***  1.000***  0.136  0.012  
NFC  -0.059  0.045  0.122  0.118  1.000***  0.332***  
NUI   0.231***  0.281***  0.778*** -0.115  0.247***  1.000***  
         
 
Panel B 
Return and Abnormal Return Regression Variables – 
IFRS Lower Left Part; NGAAP Upper Right Part 
 
 
N = 130 
 
 rt  art  art+1  et-1  Δet  Δnoit  Δnfct  Δnuit 
         
rt  1.000***  0.656*** -0.183** -0.076  0.434***  0.263*** -0.148*  0.351*** 
art  0.656***  1.000***  0.384*** -0.382***  0.479***  0.265*** -0.151*  0.405*** 
art+1 -0.183**  0.384***  1.000*** -0.220**  0.128 -0.092 -0.079  0.207** 
et-1 -0.076 -0.382*** -0.220**  1.000*** -0.593*** -0.164*  0.256*** -0.597*** 
Δet  0.435***  0.475***  0.113 -0.632***  1.000***  0.512*** -0.265***  0.880*** 
Δnoit  0.351***  0.318*** -0.166* -0.181**  0.432***  1.000***  0.375***  0.053 
Δnfct -0.138 -0.175** -0.124  0.245*** -0.304***  0.322***  1.000*** -0.428*** 
Δnuit  0.316***  0.375***  0.199** -0.619***  0.917***  0.051 -0.379***  1.000*** 
         
Notice that *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level, respectively; tested two-
sided. 
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Table 4 
Price Regressions 
 
            
 
Panel A 
Unadjusted Price Regression 
 
IFRS 
 
NGAAP  
 
DIFFERENCE N = 145 
Coef.  t-stat. Coef.  t-stat.  ΔCoef.  t-stat.
            
Intercept 16.006 *** 3.960  18.829 *** 3.746  -2.823  -0.438 
B 1.156 *** 6.771  0.905 *** 4.966  0.248  1.004 
E 1.392  1.503  2.819 ** 2.505  -1.429  -0.979 
Adj. R2 0.805 *** 35.496  0.792 *** 32.781  0.013  0.400 
F-value 42.140 ***   24.744 ***   0.46   
            
 
Panel B 
Inefficiency-Adjusted Price Regressions 
 
IFRS 
 
NGAAP  
 
DIFFERENCE N = 145 
Coef.  t-stat. Coef.  t-stat.  ΔCoef.  t-stat.
            
Intercept 15.495 *** 3.361  16.596 *** 4.086  -1.101  -0.179 
B 1.063 *** 5.784  0.923 *** 6.394  0.140  0.598 
E 2.258 *** 2.996  3.262 *** 3.357  -1.004  -0.817 
Adj. R2 0.811 *** 36.877  0.842 *** 45.613  -0.031  -1.086 
F-value 41.321 ***   52.689 ***   0.24   
            
Intercept 15.501 *** 3.845  11.861 *** 4.105  3.640  0.734 
B 0.656 * 1.965  0.577 *** 4.424  0.079  0.221 
NOI 6.183 *** 3.295  7.305 *** 6.170  -1.123  -0.506 
NFC -8.950  -1.248  -1.115  -0.467  -7.835  -1.037 
NUI 2.635 ** 2.551  2.621 *** 3.322  0.014  0.011 
Adj. R2 0.860 *** 52.034  0.914 *** 88.841  -0.054 *** -2.747 
F-value 30.299 ***   197.722 ***   0.51   
            
Intercept 15.936 *** 3.298  11.678 *** 4.001  4.257  0.754 
B 0.691 * 1.955  0.635 *** 4.008  0.056  0.145 
ORE 6.570 *** 4.014  7.316 *** 6.145  -0.746  -0.368 
OCO -6.611 *** -4.049  -7.342 *** -6.179  0.731  0.362 
NFC -8.840  -1.170  -0.395  -0.191  -8.445  -1.078 
NUI 2.422 ** 2.575  2.369 *** 2.694  0.054  0.042 
Adj. R2 0.863 *** 53.120  0.915 *** 90.038  -0.052 *** -2.710 
F-value 20.789 ***   152.724 ***   1.12   
            
The standard deviations behind the t-values are White-adjusted, see White (1980). Since N ≤ 250, the standard 
deviations are HC3, see MacKinnon and White (1985) and Long and Erwin (2000). The t-statistic for differences 
between IFRS and NGAAP is based on the assumption that pairs of regression coefficients or adjusted R2 are un-
correlated between the two reporting regimes, see Harris, Lang and Möller (1994) for an identical approach to test 
the significance of differences in the adjusted R2. The standard deviation of adjusted R2 is calculated according to 
Cramer (1987). When testing for joint differences in the regression coefficients, the reported F-value is the Chow 
test. The Vuong test based on Lien and Vuong (1987) and Vuong (1989) is postponed to Table 6 due to three pairs 
of observations containing different exchange rates and thereby different stock prices between the IFRS and 
NGAAP observations. The asterisks *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level, 
respectively; tested two-sided. 
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Table 5 
Analysis of the Marginal Contribution of IFRS Relative to NGAAP 
 
 
Panel A 
Complete Marginal Regressions 
ΔIFRS NGAAP N = 145 Coef.  t-stat. Coef.  t-stat.
        
Intercept     15.086 *** 4.651 
BNGAAP     1.059 *** 9.482 ΔBIFRS 0.730  1.308     
ENGAAP     2.684 *** 3.454 ΔEIFRS -1.123  -0.795     Δ Adj. R2 0.029  1.219     
F(ΔIFRS = 0) 2.80 *      
        
        
Intercept     12.261 *** 3.977 
BNGAAP     1.114 *** 6.922 ΔBIFRS 0.927  1.388     
ENGAAP     3.334 ** 2.486 ΔNOIIFRS 1.916  0.458     ΔNFCIFRS 17.705 * 1.859     ΔNUIIFRS -3.872  -1.501     Δ Adj. R2 0.043 * 1.859     
F(ΔIFRS = 0) 3.26 **      
        
        
Intercept     12.523 *** 3.838 
BNGAAP     1.112 *** 7.073 ΔBIFRS 0.821  0.991     
ENGAAP     3.252 ** 2.510 ΔOREIFRS 4.133  1.545     ΔOCOIFRS -3.882  -1.464     ΔNFCIFRS 12.166  1.006     ΔNUIIFRS -3.631  -1.445     Δ Adj. R2 0.045 * 1.953     
F(ΔIFRS = 0) 2.95 **      
        
 
Panel B 
Reduced Marginal Regression – Stepwise by Forward Inclusion 
ΔIFRS NGAAP N = 145 Coef.  t-stat. Coef.  t-stat.
        
Intercept     15.079 *** 4.643 
BNGAAP     0.999 *** 9.041 ΔBIFRS 0.703 *** 3.291     
ENGAAP     3.008 *** 4.053 Δ Adj. R2 0.026  1.074     
F(ΔIFRS = 0) 10.83 ***      
        
ΔB = the restatement of equity, ΔE = the restatement of earnings, ΔNOI = the restatement of net operating income, ΔNFC = the restatement of net financial cost, ΔNUI = the restatement of net unusual income, ΔORE = the restate-
ment of operating revenues and ΔOCO = the restatement of operating cost, including allocated operating taxes, due 
to the adoption of IFRS. The test statistic for the change in adjusted R2 is standard, as the change is between the 
pure NGAAP regression and the expanded NGAAP regression with reconcilement adjustments to IFRS, see e.g. 
Green (2008, pp. 89-90) for the standard test of differences in adjusted R2 when one regression is nested within the 
other. This test produces the F-value, denoted F(ΔIFRS = 0), which is also the test for whether the IFRS reconcile-
ment coefficients are different from zero. A second test statistic is provided based on Cramer (1987). But since this 
test is developed for non-nested models possibly with different dependent variables, it is less powerful than the 
standard test. The reduced regression is found by starting with a model including only NGAAP book value and 
earnings. The IFRS adoption variables are added by forward inclusion if they give a significant contribution at the 
10%-level or higher. Notice that *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level, re-
spectively; tested two-sided. 
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Table 6 
Return Regressions 
            
 
Panel A 
Unadjusted Return Regression 
  IFRS 
 
NGAAP  
 
DIFFERENCE 
N = 130 Coef.  t-stat. Coef.  t-stat.  ΔCoef.  t-stat.
            
Intercept 0.187 *** 4.432  0.210 *** 5.255  -0.023  -0.403 
e 0.542  1.295  0.457  1.273  0.085  0.154 
Δe 1.209 *** 4.779  1.115 *** 4.531  0.094  0.267 
Adj. R2 0.243 *** 3.953  0.227 *** 3.712  0.017  0.564 
F-value 18.103 ***   12.352 ***   0.06   
            
 
Panel B 
Inefficiency-Adjusted Return Regressions 
  IFRS 
 
NGAAP  
 
DIFFERENCE 
N = 130 Coef.  t-stat. Coef.  t-stat.  ΔCoef.  t-stat.
            
Intercept 0.121 ** 2.249  0.149 *** 2.868  -0.028  -0.376 
e 0.631  1.388  0.534  1.376  0.097  0.162 
Δe 1.522 *** 4.475  1.422 *** 4.168  0.100  0.208 
Adj. R2 0.224 *** 3.668  0.214 *** 3.536  0.009  0.294 
F-value 12.359 ***   9.459 ***   0.05   
            
Intercept 0.117 * 1.948  0.167 *** 2.939  -0.051  -0.615 
noi -0.019  -0.019  -0.659  -0.830  0.640  0.507 
nfc 0.631  0.304  0.647  0.375  -0.016  -0.006 
nui 1.133 ** 2.045  1.685 *** 2.764  -0.552  -0.670 
Δnoi 2.067 ** 2.048  1.494 ** 2.069  0.573  0.462 
Δnfc -3.756  -1.421  -4.806  -1.523  1.050  0.255 
Δnui 1.393 *** 4.353  1.797 *** 3.359  -0.404  -0.603 
Adj. R2 0.224 *** 3.505  0.228 *** 3.575  -0.005  -0.126 
F-value 5.082 ***   3.575 ***   0.21   
            
Intercept 0.163 ** 2.575  0.194 *** 2.894  -0.031  -0.336 
ore -0.180  -0.149  -0.910  -1.105  0.729  0.499 
oco 0.137  0.112  0.863  1.046  -0.726  -0.493 
nfc 1.473  0.537  1.583  0.661  -0.111  -0.030 
nui 1.100 * 1.932  1.445 ** 2.477  -0.345  -0.424 
Δore 2.388 ** 2.269  1.776 ** 2.546  0.612  0.485 
Δoco -2.199 ** -2.063  -1.505 ** -2.146  -0.694  -0.544 
Δnfc -4.565  -1.405  -4.420  -1.171  -0.145  -0.029 
Δnui 1.268 *** 3.296  1.572 *** 3.254  -0.303  -0.491 
Adj. R2 0.251 *** 3.847  0.249 *** 3.823  0.002  0.035 
F-value 4.291 ***   3.800 ***   0.15   
The test statistic of the difference in adjusted R2 is based on Lien and Vuong (1987) and Vuong (1989) as the two 
regressions are non-nested with a common dependent variable. The test statistic of the adjusted R2 in each individ-
ual regression is based on Cramer (1987). The F-value for the overall difference in the coefficient structure is the 
Chow test. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level, respectively; tested two-
sided. 
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Table 7 
Analysis of the Marginal Contribution of IFRS Relative to NGAAP 
 
 
Panel A 
Complete Marginal Regressions 
 
ΔIFRS NGAAP N = 130 Coef.  t-stat. Coef.  t-stat.
        
Intercept     0.127 ** 2.300 
eNGAAP     0.625  1.393 ΔeNGAAP     1.541 *** 4.517 ΔΔeIFRS 0.983  1.175     Δ Adj. R2IFRS 0.008  0.377     
F(ΔIFRS = 0) 1.38       
        
        
Intercept     0.115 ** 2.157 
eNGAAP     0.626  1.365 ΔeNGAAP     1.735 *** 4.587 ΔΔnoiIFRS 2.344 ** 2.289     ΔΔnfcIFRS 1.499  0.284     ΔΔnuiIFRS -1.552  -1.396     Δ Adj. R2IFRS 0.055  1.503     
F(ΔIFRS = 0) 2.80 **      
        
        
Intercept     0.135 ** 2.489 
eNGAAP     0.645  1.359 ΔeNGAAP     1.756 *** 4.503 ΔΔoreIFRS 2.474 ** 2.518     ΔΔocoIFRS -2.276 ** -2.364     ΔΔnfcIFRS -1.609  -0.232     ΔΔnuiIFRS -2.073 * -1.693     Δ Adj. R2IFRS 0.064  1.460     
F(ΔIFRS = 0) 2.55 **      
        
 
Panel B 
Reduced Marginal Regression – Stepwise with Forward Inclusion 
 
ΔIFRS NGAAP N = 130 Coef.  t-stat. Coef.  t-stat.
        
Intercept     0.106 ** 2.046 
eNGAAP     0.680  1.476 ΔeNGAAP     1.732 *** 4.714 ΔΔnoiIFRS 2.410 ** 2.268     Δ Adj. R2IFRS 0.053  1.563     
F(ΔIFRS = 0) 5.14 **      
        
The test statistic for the change in adjusted R2 is standard, as the change is between the pure NGAAP regression 
and the expanded NGAAP regression with reconcilement adjustments to IFRS, see e.g. Green (2008, pp. 89-90) for 
the standard test of differences in adjusted R2 when one regression is nested within the other. This test produces the 
F-value, denoted F(ΔIFRS = 0), which is also the test for whether the IFRS reconcilement coefficients are different 
from zero. A second test statistic is provided based on Lien and Vuong (1987) and Vuong (1989). But since this 
test is developed for non-nested models with a common dependent variable, it is less powerful than the standard 
test. Notice that *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level, respectively; tested 
two-sided. 
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Table 8 
Abnormal Return Regressions 
 
            
 
Panel A 
Inefficiency-Adjusted Abnormal Return Regression 
 
 
IFRS 
 
NGAAP  
 
DIFFERENCE N = 130 
Coef.  t-stat. Coef.  t-stat.  ΔCoef.  t-stat.
            
Intercept -0.045  -0.956  -0.029  -0.655  -0.015  -0.240 
Δe 1.203 *** 3.133  1.222 *** 3.349  -0.019  -0.036 
Adj. R2 0.157 *** 2.801  0.165 *** 2.912  -0.008  -0.510 
F-value 9.814 ***   11.213 ***   0.03   
            
 
Panel B 
Unadjusted Abnormal Return Regressions 
 
 
IFRS 
 
NGAAP  
 
DIFFERENCE N = 130 
Coef.  t-stat. Coef.  t-stat.  ΔCoef.  t-stat.
            
Intercept -0.106 *** -2.884  -0.093 ** -2.611  -0.013  -0.261 
Δe 0.940 *** 5.240  0.939 *** 5.365  0.002  0.006 
Adj. R2 0.220 *** 3.657  0.223 *** 3.705  -0.003  -0.193 
F-value 27.457 ***   28.787 ***   0.04   
            
Intercept -0.120 *** -3.142  -0.095 ** -2.596  -0.025  -0.481 
Δnoi 1.679 ** 2.485  1.110 ** 2.013  0.569  0.652 
Δnfc -3.024 * -1.818  -1.963  -0.975  -1.061  -0.406 
Δnui 0.668 ** 2.054  0.832 ** 2.358  -0.164  -0.342 
Adj. R2 0.237 *** 3.817  0.214 *** 3.482  0.023  0.627 
F-value 7.304 ***   7.791 ***   0.13   
            
Intercept -0.120 *** -3.123  -0.089 ** -2.156  -0.031  -0.545 
Δore 1.670 ** 2.396  1.074 * 1.920  0.596  0.667 
Δoco -1.679 ** -2.342  -1.117 * -1.878  -0.563  -0.604 
Δnfc -3.013 * -1.674  -2.083  -0.997  -0.930  -0.337 
Δnui 0.673 ** 2.014  0.845 ** 2.312  -0.172  -0.347 
Adj. R2 0.231 *** 3.690  0.210 *** 3.388  0.021  0.548 
F-value 5.341 ***   5.863 ***   0.13   
            
The test statistic of the difference in adjusted R2 is based on Lien and Vuong (1987) and Vuong (1989) as the two 
regressions are non-nested with a common dependent variable. The test statistic of the adjusted R2 in each individ-
ual regression is based on Cramer (1987). The F-value for the overall difference in the coefficient structure is the 
Chow test. The asterisks *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level, respectively; 
tested two-sided. 
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Table 9 
Analysis of the Marginal Contribution of IFRS Relative to NGAAP 
        
 
Panel A 
Complete Marginal Regression 
 
ΔIFRS NGAAP N = 130 Coef.  t-stat. Coef.  t-stat.
        
Intercept     -0.101 *** -2.621 ΔeNGAAP     0.963 *** 5.347 ΔΔeIFRS 0.415  0.865     Δ Adj. R2IFRS -0.002  -0.180     
F(ΔIFRS = 0) 0.75       
        
        
Intercept     -0.114 *** -3.130 ΔeNGAAP     1.072 *** 4.985 ΔΔnoiIFRS 1.257 ** 2.159     ΔΔnfcIFRS -2.831  -0.673     ΔΔnuiIFRS -1.121  -1.084     Δ Adj. R2IFRS 0.026  0.904     
F(ΔIFRS = 0) 2.03       
        
        
Intercept     -0.096 *** -2.451 ΔeNGAAP     1.079 *** 5.058 ΔΔoreIFRS 1.354 ** 2.506     ΔΔocoIFRS -1.188 ** -2.299     ΔΔnfcIFRS -5.465  -0.884     ΔΔnuiIFRS -1.575  -1.450     Δ Adj. R2IFRS 0.037  0.905     
F(ΔIFRS = 0) 1.98       
        
 
Panel B 
Reduced Marginal Regression – Stepwise with Forward Inclusion 
 
ΔIFRS NGAAP N = 130 Coef.  t-stat. Coef.  t-stat.
        
Intercept     -0.112 *** -3.164 ΔeNGAAP     1.050 *** 5.074 ΔΔnoiIFRS 1.265 ** 2.059     Δ Adj. R2IFRS 0.021  1.262     
F(ΔIFRS = 0) 4.24 **      
        
The test statistic for the change in adjusted R2 is standard, as the change is between the pure NGAAP regression 
and the expanded NGAAP regression with reconcilement adjustments to IFRS, see e.g. Green (2008, pp. 89-90) for 
the standard test of differences in adjusted R2 when one regression is nested within the other. This test produces the 
F-value, denoted F(ΔIFRS = 0), which is also the test for whether the IFRS reconcilement coefficients are different 
from zero. A second test statistic is provided based on Lien and Vuong (1987) and Vuong (1989). But since this 
test is developed for non-nested models with a common dependent variable, it is less powerful than the standard 
test. Notice that *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level, respectively; tested 
two-sided. 
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Table 10 
Inefficiency-Adjusted Abnormal Return Regressions – 
Robustness for Extreme Observations 
 
            
 
Panel A 
Removal of 1% Highest and 1% Lowest of All Dfbetas Conditioned on Matched Pairs 
 
IFRS NGAAP  DIFFERENCE N = 124 Coef.  t-stat. Coef.  t-stat.  ΔCoef.  t-stat.
            
Intercept -0.125 *** -4.424  -0.089 *** -2.899  -0.036  -0.873 
Δnoi 2.054 *** 4.137  1.157 ** 2.125  0.897  1.237 
Δnfc -3.660 *** -2.814  -3.060  -1.519  -0.600  -0.250 
Δnui 0.960 *** 3.403  1.086 ** 2.613  -0.126  -0.251 
Adj. R2 0.425 *** 7.091  0.357 *** 5.672  0.069  1.543 
F-value 12.121 ***   26.684 ***   0.57   
            
Intercept     -0.111 *** -3.797     
ΔeNGAAP     1.481 *** 7.714     
ΔΔnoiIFRS         2.088 *** 3.000 
ΔΔnfcIFRS         1.797  0.663 
ΔΔnuiIFRS         -0.604  -0.809 
Δ Adj. R2IFRS         0.081 ** 2.216 
F(ΔIFRS = 0)         3.49 **  
            
 
Panel B 
Removal of the 5% Observations with the Highest Cook's D Conditioned on Matched Pairs 
 
IFRS NGAAP  DIFFERENCE N = 122 Coef.  t-stat. Coef.  t-stat.  ΔCoef.  t-stat.
            
Intercept -0.120 *** -4.155  -0.092 *** -3.205  -0.028  -0.692 
Δnoi 1.699 *** 2.815  0.887 ** 2.003  0.882  1.085 
Δnfc -3.929 ** -2.473  -4.177 ** -2.155  0.248  0.099 
Δnui 0.756 *** 3.030  0.740 *** 3.118  0.017  0.048 
Adj. R2 0.300 *** 4.642  0.258 *** 4.001  0.042  1.025 
F-value 7.683 ***   14.670 ***   0.47   
            
Intercept     -0.105 *** -3.644     
ΔeNGAAP     1.279 *** 7.402     
ΔΔnoiIFRS         1.833 ** 2.531 
ΔΔnfcIFRS         2.894  1.361 
ΔΔnuiIFRS         -0.494  -0.749 
Δ Adj. R2IFRS         0.075 ** 2.001 
F(ΔIFRS = 0)         2.87 **  
            
Dfbeta is a measure of each observation's influence on the coefficient estimates, variable for variable. Cook's D is a 
measure of each observation's overall influence on the regression. The t-values are based on HC3 standard deviations, 
cf. Table 4. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level, respectively; tested two-
sided. 
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Table 11 
Abnormal Return Regressions – 
Weighted by Intangible Assets 
            
 
Panel A 
WLS by the Intangible-to-Total Asset Ratio 
IFRS NGAAP  DIFFERENCE N = 130 Coef.  t-stat. Coef.  t-stat.  ΔCoef.  t-stat.
            
Intercept -0.093 ** -2.445  -0.094 ** -2.199  0.001  0.024 Δnoi 2.180 *** 3.142  2.127 *** 2.845  0.054  0.053 Δnfc -1.856  -0.685  -2.547  -0.923  0.691  0.179 Δnui 1.505 *** 5.324  1.516 *** 4.951  -0.011  -0.026 
Adj. R2 0.463 *** 8.211  0.448 *** 7.806  0.016  0.697 
F-value 13.339 ***   17.610 ***   0.08   
            
Intercept     -0.088 * -1.935     ΔeNGAAP     1.761 *** 5.513     ΔΔnoiIFRS         6.087 *** 3.044 ΔΔnfcIFRS         3.033  0.628 ΔΔnuiIFRS         0.378  0.359 Δ Adj. R2IFRS         0.050  0.891 
F(ΔIFRS = 0)         4.31 ***  
            
 
Panel B 
WLS by 1 - the Intangible-to-Total Asset Ratio 
IFRS NGAAP  DIFFERENCE N = 130 Coef.  t-stat. Coef.  t-stat.  ΔCoef.  t-stat.
            
Intercept -0.040  -0.648  -0.034  -0.757  -0.006  -0.078 Δnoi 0.373  0.239  0.111  0.105  0.262  0.139 Δnfc -2.256  -0.828  -0.419  -0.130  -1.837  -0.436 Δnui 1.295  1.542  1.640 * 1.766  -0.345  -0.276 
Adj. R2 0.138 ** 2.437  0.169 *** 2.859  -0.031  -1.206 
F-value 3.366 **   3.972 ***   0.06   
            
Intercept     -0.052  -1.123     ΔeNGAAP     1.384 *** 2.728     ΔΔnoiIFRS         1.522 * 1.819 ΔΔnfcIFRS         -2.901  -0.428 ΔΔnuiIFRS         -2.217  -1.195 Δ Adj. R2IFRS         0.021  0.598 
F(ΔIFRS = 0)         1.56   
            
 
Panel C 
Differences between the Marginal Regression of Panel A and B 
   DIFFERENCE N = 130 
    ΔΔCoef.  t-stat.
            ΔΔnoiIFRS         4.565 ** 2.106 ΔΔnfcIFRS         5.935  0.713 ΔΔnuiIFRS         2.596  1.216 Δ Adj. R2IFRS         0.028  0.423             
The asterisks *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level, respectively; tested two-
sided. 
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Table 12 
Abnormal Return Regressions – 
Weighted by Profitability 
            
 
Panel A 
WLS by the Rank of the Return on Equity 
IFRS NGAAP  DIFFERENCE N = 130 Coef.  t-stat. Coef.  t-stat.  ΔCoef.  t-stat.
            
Intercept -0.057  -1.288  -0.049  -1.112  -0.008  -0.123 Δnoi 1.704 ** 2.509  1.542 ** 2.538  0.162  0.178 Δnfc -2.430  -0.847  -2.055  -0.553  -0.376  -0.080 Δnui 0.484  1.187  0.599  1.137  -0.115  -0.172 
Adj. R2 0.247 *** 3.953  0.195 *** 3.221  0.052 *** 2.633 
F-value 2.324 *   2.460 *   0.02   
            
Intercept     -0.048  -1.147     ΔeNGAAP     0.852 ** 2.398     ΔΔnoiIFRS         1.618  0.992 ΔΔnfcIFRS         -8.185  -1.112 ΔΔnuiIFRS         -0.515  -0.416 Δ Adj. R2IFRS         0.020  0.867 
F(ΔIFRS = 0)         0.67   
            
 
Panel B 
WLS by the Rank of -ROE 
IFRS NGAAP  DIFFERENCE N = 130 Coef.  t-stat. Coef.  t-stat.  ΔCoef.  t-stat.
            
Intercept -0.041  -0.541  -0.049  -0.923  0.008  0.085 Δnoi -0.362  -0.170  -0.526  -0.469  0.164  0.068 Δnfc 0.314  0.071  3.809  0.744  -3.494  -0.518 Δnui 2.151 * 1.728  2.773 * 1.968  -0.623  -0.331 
Adj. R2 0.211 *** 3.425  0.283 *** 4.516  -0.072 * -1.696 
F-value 3.339 **   4.172 ***   0.13   
            
Intercept     -0.040  -0.616     ΔeNGAAP     2.141 *** 2.713     ΔΔnoiIFRS         2.278 ** 2.412 ΔΔnfcIFRS         0.699  0.085 ΔΔnuiIFRS         -4.135 * -1.765 Δ Adj. R2IFRS         0.060  0.828 
F(ΔIFRS = 0)         2.55 *  
            
 
Panel C 
Differences between the Marginal Regression of Panel A and B 
   DIFFERENCE N = 130     ΔΔCoef.  t-stat.
            ΔΔnoiIFRS         -0.660  -0.350 ΔΔnfcIFRS         -8.884  -0.806 ΔΔnuiIFRS         3.619  1.366 Δ Adj. R2IFRS         -0.040  -0.526             
Notice that *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level, respectively; tested two-
sided. 
 
